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Mythological Models in Civilization Analysis
Vytautas Kavolis
This paper was presented at the Conference on Civilizational Patterns and
Intercivilizational Encounters, held by the International Society for the Comparative
Study of Civilizations, August 30-31, 1973, at the University of Chicago.
I need to begin by defining several key terms.






By a symbolic design I refer to an objectified, or documented, arrangement of
meanings, perceptions, and emotional nuances which constitutes an identifiable
configuration that, at any given time, provides a relatively self-contained and
understandable unit of empirical investigation.
By the symbolic designs of a civilization I refer to configurations of meanings,
perceptions, and emotional nuances which are so distinctive and so widely
influential that, at any given time, they identify the major differences in what
might be called the “qualities of mind” between the largest comprehensible
units of sociocultural investigation at each level of societal evolution — these
largest comprehensible units constituting “civilizations.”
By civilizational analysis, finally, I refer to the study of any symbolic designs,
when they are seen as components of one or another of the largest
comprehensible units of sociocultural investigation and compared across the
boundaries of such units.1

Civilizational analysis may be conducted either in the traditional “humanistic” or the
“sociological” manner. When conducted sociologically, it must meet the further
requirement that linkages between symbolic designs and modes of social organization
be investigated.
In my view, it is at least as advantageous, in the comparative study of the symbolic
designs of civilizations, to begin with the significant detail as to attempt to comprehend
the total structure within which this detail is located. As one proceeds in analyzing the
significant detail, one’s analytical framework necessarily expands into the aspects of
the total structure relevant to it.

Benjamin Nelson and Vytautas Kavolis, “The Civilization-Analytical Approach to Comparative
Studies,” Comparative Civilizations Bulletin, 5 (Spring, 1973), pp. 13-14.
1
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But focusing on the significant details permits us to be more sensitive to changes over
time in the symbolic designs and the underlying structures of consciousness and
sensibility, a topic which civilizationists, in contrast to the intellectual historians, have
tended rather to neglect (unless their own background has been in Geistesgeschichte).2
By the term “significant detail” I am not referring to a descriptive element such as a
particular deity in the scheme of Georges Dumézil, but to a thematic component treated,
in some way, in a mythological system (or in its equivalents) and either embodied in
an anthropomorphic or animate figure or expressed more abstractly.3
Anthropomorphic constructs embodying a thematic component frequently provide the
added bonus of a sociopsychological theory suggesting how this thematic component
is perceived to have been motivated and how this kind of motivation is thought to have
developed over time.
An anthropomorphic mythological construct may provide: (1) a universal model for
conceptualizing a particular type of behavior, (2) a psychological theory revealing how,
and of what materials, a particular civilization constructs psychological theories, and
(3) a specification of the sociological framework within which either (a) the particular
type of behavior tends to arise or (b) the particular psychological theory is generated.
These general considerations may be substantiated by comparing the myths of
Prometheus and of Satan, both of which treat the general theme of rebellion by an
individual against the supreme authority in the established order and against the rules
by which this order operates.4 But Prometheus rebels, in stealing fire against the
prohibition of Zeus, motivated by sympathy for the sufferings of others than himself
— people deprived of fire; and he gives them practical assistance without imposing on
them either his own values or his leadership. He permits them to incorporate his
technical gifts into the structure of their own life, as they themselves see fit.

In my usage of these terms, a “structure of consciousness” or a “structure of sensibility” refers to a
state of mind or perceptual orientation widely shared by people in a particular sociohistorical setting
but inferable only through the specific symbolic designs produced and employed for communication in
such settings. Over-simplifying it somewhat, a symbolic design is immediately visible in a particular
work of culture; the structure of consciousness – which might also be called the “depth structure of
symbolic designs” – is a much more general construct which the analyst employs for explaining the
characteristics shared by a variety of specific symbolic designs.
3
C. Scott Littleton, The New Comparative Mythology: An Anthropological Assessment of the
Theories of Georges Dumézil (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).
4
On Prometheus, see Friedrich Solmsen, Hesiod and Aeschylus (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1949), and George Thomson, Aeschylus and Athens: A Study in the Social Origins of Drama
(London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1966). On Satan Rivkah Scharf Kluger, Satan in the Old Testament
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967), and Henry A. Murray, “The Personality and Career
of Satan,” Journal of Social Issues, 18 (October 1962), pp. 36 – 54.
2
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Surely, what might be called the “humane attachment — practical assistance
mechanism” is a universal possibility, experienced and observed by people in all
civilizations. But what is remarkable is that the Greeks — or some significant Greeks
— have associated the humane attachment — practical assistance mechanism with
what they themselves thought of as the crime of rebellion against established authority
or, perhaps more precisely, against the existing normative order.
Rebellion is therefore a “noble crime”; and, in the long run, the substantive personal
virtue of the individual overcomes the formal criminality of his act.
This is one model for conceptualizing the behavior of the rebel. The other is the Satanic
model. As described in the literature of the Judeo-Christian tradition since the second
century BCE, but especially in the Medieval Christian writings, Satan rebels out of
resentment.
The causes of his resentment are variously interpreted by the theologians: he is the first
of the angels who thinks he has been replaced in God’s affection by a younger sibling
— Christ; he objects to having been created by someone else and wants to be his own
maker. But he rebels not out of sympathy for others, but from resentment of what he
perceives as deprivation of his interest. And he is wholly unconcerned with any
practical needs. His concern, apparently, is to create a total alternative to the divine
order, an “adversary culture,” and, within it, to assume God’s place.
But the results of his activities are wholly destructive. While Prometheus, who started
by providing a useful service, ends up creating a new conception of justice which even
Zeus, in the Aeschylean trilogy, eventually comes to accept, Satan proves unable to
create any values and can mock the old only by inverting them. The would-be total
innovator is enchained to the inverse of all of the old.
Satanic behavior can be conceptualized psychologically as governed by the resentmentdestruction mechanism.
Surely this mechanism, too, is a universal possibility,
experienced and observed by people in all civilizations. But note that in the JudeoChristian, and particularly the medieval Christian, tradition, it is the resentmentdestruction mechanism that is firmly attached to the theme of rebellion against the
established and the normative order represented by it. Within this tradition, there is no
nobility in the crime of rebellion against the normative order. Personal virtue therefore
cannot overcome the crime; it can be dealt with only the forces of “law and order.”
The connection between rebellion and the resentment-destruction mechanism is much
more central to the Christian tradition than the linkage between rebellion and the
sympathy-assistance mechanism in the Greek civilization. Prometheus was far less
important in Greek mythology than Satan in the medieval Christian.
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But, centrality aside, the linkage of the cultural theme of rebellion with the
psychological mechanism of humane attachment resulting in practical assistance to
others is, among the historic civilizations, a distinctively Greek theme.
The old Plato would not have treasured it, but in no other premodern civilization has
this linkage of themes been given a mythological elaboration anywhere approaching
that given to it by Hesiod and Aeschylus. And we are concerned not only with what is
central to a civilization, but also with what is unique in it.
We have, so far, two interpretative models of rebellion, both potentially applicable to
the behavior of actual rebels in any civilization. The first model suggests that rebellion
motivated by humane sympathy for the suffering of others and expressed through
particular acts of practical assistance, results in an enduringly valuable change in the
structure of the moral universe. The other model contents that rebellion motivated by
personal resentment and expressed in global attempts to create an alternative style of
life and impose it on others, is destructive in its consequences.
We also have the historical fact that one of these potentially universal theories of
rebellion has been created by important representatives of the Greek civilization, and
the other has possessed immense influence in the medieval Christian civilization (and
in some of its secular derivatives).
Is the selection of the theoretical model by which to interpret rebellion a consequence
of the different behavior of rebels in the two civilizations or is it an expression of
differences in the cognitive structure of the two civilizations at the time when these
models acquired their hold over the imagination?
Before addressing myself to this question, however, I wish to compare the
psychogenetic theories contained, or implied, in the Promethean and the Satanic
legends, to account for the origins of the rebel. What is most distinctive of Satan at his
earliest appearance in the Old Testament is that he is a function of God specializing in
ferreting out potential transgressors and bringing them to God’s attention to be
punished. He is, on the one hand, an absolute servant, created by his master, who has
no existence of his own, no civil rights, and no social ties except the bond of obedience
against which he eventually rebels; and, on the other hand, he is the enforcer of
morality. When the absolute servant rebels, he can only imagine himself replacing the
despot at the peak of the power structure, without disturbing the structure itself; and he
will be even more merciless than his former master. And he who begins as the enforcer
of morality, ends as the great corrupter.
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Prometheus, on the other hand, is an independent from the very beginning of his
conscious existence. He has his own independent position, not delegated to him by a
higher authority; he has his own relatives, wife, and children; and above all, he has his
own knowledge — the ability to predict the future — which is in fact superior to the
knowledge possessed by the ruler of the gods.5
It would have been inconceivable for Satan to have known more than God does. That
is, the Satanic rebel acts out of ignorance, on the basis of an inferior, self-deceptive
theory. Or so the Judeo-Christian tradition, in which knowledge tends to be
thematically linked with power, interprets the intellectual condition of the rebel. In
Greece, it was possible for highest power to be perceived as devoid of knowledge (as
well as of virtue).
Prometheus, then, begins as the equivalent of a knowledgeable, high-status adolescent
used to making his own decisions. The first significant decision he makes is, in fact,
one to support Zeus in his battle against the Titans, who are members of Prometheus’s
own family. This decision — in some ways the equivalent of Crane Brinton’s
“desertion of the intellectuals” in the revolutionary process — proves to be a mistake,
since Zeus in power becomes a ruthless tyrant.6
Moreover, rebellion, for Prometheus – if not necessarily in conscious intention, then in
its objective effects – functions as an expiation for the unintended wrongs he had earlier
helped to arise by having aligned himself with an emergent tyranny. While the
expiation is not specifically mentioned in the Greek texts, the logic of Promethean
behavior permits this interpretation, as Satanic behavior does not: Satan could feel no
guilt for what he had done in serving his master, since, having been created entirely as
a tool of that master, he had no choice in his initial actions. It is he who perceives
himself as the blameless tool of a greater power, rather than he who has reason to know
he has been foolish in his own judgments, that develops into the resentful destroyer.

5

The relationship of Prometheus to feminine figures is worth noting. By some accounts, it was Athena
(whom Prometheus, by splitting the skull of Zeus, helped to be born; thus, a woman “of the younger
generation”) who taught him many of the practical skills he then transmitted to men. And it was his
mother, Themis, who provided him with his ultimate resource – knowledge of the future. Prometheus
not only does not misuse women to gratify his whims (as Greek gods habitually do), but he makes good
use of the creative strengths women possess and willingly share with him. He is unafraid to be
dependent on women at the same time that he helps them. In contrast, there are no significant women
in Satan’s early history, and in his later career he manipulates women to achieve his goal of seducing
men to do the evil. In this respect, he is somewhat comparable to Zeus who sends Pandora, the first
human woman, to punish men for receiving the Promethean gift of fire. But in the Greek scheme, it
was the highest god – not an evil spirit – who both misused women to indulge himself and manipulated
them to exercise his control over men.
6
Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1938).
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One further element in the background of Prometheus is his part as a trickster god who
delights in substituting bones and fat for meat in the sacrifice to Zeus and thus deceiving
the supreme authority without any motive apparent in this action other than the pure
fun of it.7 Satan, on the other hand, does not appear capable of pure fun, unrelated to
the single-mindedness of his service to God (in his earlier career) or to that of his
rebellion against God (in his later identity).
Thus, the final psychogenetic summary of the evolution of Satanic and Promethean
types of rebellion: abstract justice, combined with resentment, corrupts the absolute
servant; playful trickery, to which sympathetic kindness is added, permits a moral
evolution in an independent mind.
We now have not only two models of rebellious behavior, but also two psychological
theories of how these respective types of behavior have come about. And the
civilization-comparative question may be repeated on another level: why did the Greek
and the Judeo-Christian civilizations develop different “psychological” theories of the
origin of rebellion against authority?
Two possible approaches to this question may be suggested.
1. The first focuses on differences in the depth structure of moral thinking of the
two civilizations.
The classical Judeo-Christian tendency, reinforced by Iranian influences, and
surviving in a variety of secular ideologies of Western-European derivation, has
been to adopt a “mobilizing,” or “reifying,” attitude toward moral issues.
The goal implicit in this attitude is to enhance the “good” and to exorcise the
“evil” in one’s experience and personality by rigidly separating them, as object
of total worship and absolute condemnation, in the mythological constructs
used to comprehend experiences and subjective states of the personality.
The Greeks, in contrast, have tended to adopt a “developmental,” or
“dialectical,” attitude toward moral issues, with the implicit goal of integrating
the potential “evil” (e.g., the authority of the legal order) in such a way that the
“evil” is gradually transformed into the “good,” or functions as an indispensable
challenge to it, while the “good” must be exposed to a searching criticism of its
claims, in the absence of which it stands in danger of revealing itself as (or
degenerating into) another form of “evil.”

On the parallels between Prometheus and American Indian trickster gods, see Karl Kerényi, “The
Trickster in Relation to Greek Mythology,” in Paul Radin, The Trickster: A Study in American Indian
Mythology (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), pp. 180-182.
7
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This attitude is evident not only in the Promethean myth, and in the conception
of Zeus, in whom, as Paul Ricoeur puts it, “the problematics of the ‘wicked
god,’ the undivided unity of the divine and the satanic, reaches its highest
pitch,” but also in the treatment of Dionysus, in whom Christ-like and Satanlike elements are intertwined.8, 9


In contrast to India, where dualistic categories (the purity-pollution
distinction) are used to separate hierarchically arranged eternal entities;



In contrast to historic China, where polarities (in the Yin-Yang paradigm)
are designed to encourage peaceful cooperation with a minimal change of
identity;



In contrast to the medieval European tradition, in which polar opposites
either battle energetically until the final solution, the outcome of which is
predetermined (the God-Satan model) or are mutually interdependent in a
static hierarchical relationship, which it is impermissible to challenge (as in
the notion of the “marriage” of the soul with the body, in which the
“masculine” soul is entitled to the obedience of the “feminine” body);10



In contrast to all of these conceptions of the proper relationship between
polar opposites, the Greeks have conceived of a dialectic in which the
opposites evolve, changing their own characters and the structure of their
setting, in the course of a battle in which the cards are not stacked in advance
in favor of one participant, as they are in the God-Satan paradigm. The
“Promethean” dialectic has subsequently re-emerged in the Romantic
imagination, whereupon it was Christianized by the Marxists.11

Hierarchy challenged and torn apart by a dualism is one of the relatively
constant themes distinctive of Western civilization. But the content of the
dualistic or dialectical “battle” changes over time. Three modalities of the
Western dialectic seem particularly important:

8

Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 218.
On Dionysus, see Walter F. Otto, Dionysus: Myth and Cult (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1965), and Philip E. Slater, The Glory of Hera: Greek Mythology and the Greek Family (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1968). The author adds “Freud and Goethe” in pen here.
10
Rosalie E. Osmond, “Body, Soul, and the Marriage Relationship: The History of an Analogy,”
Journal of the History of Ideas, 34 (April–June 1973), pp. 283-290.
11
M. H. Abrams, Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature (New
York: W. SW. Norton & Company, 1971).
9
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a) The “medieval”: The God-Satan struggle between good and evil;
b) The “modern”: Irrational tradition in conflict with utilitarian calculability;
and
c) The “post-modern”: A Rousseauist tension between collectively binding
social contracts and individual moral-aesthetic sensibilities.12
Each of these three modalities seems to be less necessarily committed to the
imagery of “total war” for conceiving of the relationship between the opposites
defining it.
2

The second approach to explaining the differences between the Greek and the
Judeo-Christian models of rebellious behavior, and between their theories of
the origin of such behavior, can be made on the social-structural level. Satan
has originated within the general framework of a militaristic Mesopotamian
“oriental despotism,” where the obligation of everyone, including the highest
officials, has been to serve the ruler in the manner of disciplined soldiers, and
in which, since the supreme authority was always right, rebellion necessarily
appeared as the upheaval of primeval chaos against the righteousness of
civilization.13
The Mesopotamian type of “oriental despotism” may be contrasted to the
bureaucratic “oriental despotism” of historic China, where officials, and to
some degree other classes, adhered to generalized moral standards of their own,
by which they could define their own dignity and even judge their supreme
authority, the emperor — thus retaining, at least in theory, a certain margin of
group (though not individual) independence relative to him. In the Chinese
framework, in which supreme power could legitimately be perceived as
deficient in knowledge and in virtue, rebellion could not easily be interpreted
in terms of a Satanic model and tended to be legitimated by the rebels
themselves, until the nineteenth century, in the not particularly dualistic terms
of the nature mysticism of popular Taoism and the reassertion of traditional
peasant values.14

Particular components of the “post-modern” psychocultural dialectic can be referred back to the
distant past: the Promethean myth, Roman law, the Tristanic legend, the Lutheran conscience. What is
“post-modern” is the dominance of this tension among the formulators of cultural imagery of the
present age.
13
Karl A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1957). Wittfogel does not recognize the importance of the “symbolic” distinction
made here.
14
Etienne Balazs, Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), p.
165.
12
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The myth of Prometheus has been put together in a society which cultivated
“individualistic heroism” in social action and in fact provided opportunities for
a privileged elite, to seek this goal. When Prometheus first appears, the
breaking down of clan controls was taking place in the absence of a dominant
state organization. With the Chinese scholar-official, or a John Stuart Mill,
Prometheus shares an aristocratic sense of obligation for the “lower orders.”
But he pursues the call of this obligation in his own “individually heroic” way,
without waiting for legitimation by any traditional standard or generalized
system of faith.
A society which permits individualistic action for at least some of its members
is probably necessary for such trust in one’s own private moral sensitivities, not
sanctioned by any agency or tradition external to the individual to be imagined.
And when Prometheus attains his full development, in the tragedies of
Aeschylus, there is at least a segmental democracy operating in Athens.
Another structural characteristic of the Greek society relevant to the
Promethean theme is the lack of effective control by an organized priesthood
over the interpretation of moral issues, whereas in the Mesopotamian
framework such priesthoods tended to be organized, like the state, along the
lines of a militaristic “oriental despotism.” (And even the Hebrew prophets
spoke in the name of obedience to the supreme authority, daring to question
only the power of the middle-level authorities, much as Russian peasant rebels
did in relation to the Czar and his subordinates until the end of the nineteenth
century.)
The militantly organized Church was presumably more important than the
feudal state in regenerating the Satanic theory in Europe from the twelfth
century on, and then briefly, on both the Catholic and the Protestant sides,
during the height of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation. In modern
revolutionary regimes, we find a similar correlation between Satanic theories
and control by the equivalent of an organized priesthood over the interpretation
of moral issues.
The Satanic theory of rebellious behavior appears to require both a social
structure built for the maximization of obedience and elimination of
independence, and an intellectual tradition of rigorous (non-cooperative)
dualism. A civilization, like the traditional Chinese, which eliminates
individual independence in politically relevant action, but which does not favor
rigorous dualism in thought, does not generate Satanic interpretations of
rebellious behavior.
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And in the post-medieval bourgeois societies of Western Europe, including
those of the most rigorous Calvinistic shaping — which tended, however, to
seek maximization of individual independence in social action — the hold of
Satan did not last. Given an obedience-maximizing structure and a dualistic
tradition, social strains and particularly threats to this structure and tradition
increase the likelihood, and the virulence, of Satanic theories.15
It is conceivable that conditions under which Satanic theories arise also favor
Satanic behavior, as twentieth-century totalitarianisms suggest. But a
mythological model should probably be seen not as a reflection of observed,
that is already existing behavior, but as an expression of the categories of
imagination shaped by the conjunction of a social structure and a cognitive
model. In imagination, however, designs for alternative modes of behavior are
tried out (and sometimes, of course, found wanting).
Thus, the analysis of the interpretations of rebellious behavior underlines the
impossibility of understanding the distinctive symbolic designs of civilizations either
without reference to their social structures or as direct reflections of their social
structures. Nor, in all likelihood, should differences in symbolic designs be read as
registering corresponding differences in visible behavior, or the absence of a particular
symbolic design be interpreted as indicating the absence of the behavior which other
peoples conceptualize in such designs.
What symbolic designs express exists, outside of them, only in the imagination; and
not everything which exists outside of the imagination is transformed into its basic
categories.
I shall conclude by re-emphasizing two methodological points.
(1) An effective approach to the comparative study of the symbolic designs of
civilizations is to focus on a particular theme, found in several civilizations, and
embodied in a cultural product that lends itself to both psychological and
sociological analysis.
(2) A productive method of analysis, within this approach, is to look for the
linkages of key notions — socially strategic concepts which are treated, in
particular civilizations, as necessarily associated with each other, or as mutually
exclusive, or as having an indeterminate and variable relationship between
themselves.

15

Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Messianism in Medieval and
Reformation Europe and Its Bearing on Modern Totalitarian Movements, Rev. Ed. (New York: Harper
Torchbooks, 1961).
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Linkages between an ideological notion such as rebellion, and a psychological
mechanism presumed to be underlying the behavior oriented to this notion are also
worth noting.
Presumed interdependencies between the notions of power, knowledge, virtue, and law
have been brought out as particularly important in the present case. But, for an
adequate analysis of the symbolic designs of civilizations through linkages between
key notions, an inventory of perhaps twenty to fifty such notions, for each civilization
at distinguishable stages of its development, might be needed.
Summary Table: Two Modes of Rebellion
LEVEL OF ANALYSIS

THE SATANIC MODEL

THE PROMETHEAN
MODEL

Described Behavior

Total rebellion against
normative structure

Inferred Motivation

Resentment – destructive
mechanism

Social Role Antecedent
to Rebellion
Sociocultural
Environment

Absolute servant,
enforcer of morality
Obedience-maximizing
social structure, radically
dualistic cognitive
tradition

Partial rebellion against a
particular aspect of the
normative structure
Humane sympathy –
practical assistance
mechanism
Independent agent,
knowledgeable trickster
Obedience-minimizing
social structure,
“dialectical” conception of
relationship between
opposites in cognitive
tradition
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